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Book Review
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FED1
ERALIST PERIOD, 1789 - 1801. By David P. Currie.
Chicago, IL: U. of Chicago Press. 1997. Pp. Xv, 327.
Hardcover, $32.50.
John Harrison
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Thucydides the Athenian set out to make a record of the
struggle between his people and the Pelopennesians that would
be a possession for all time. 3 In order to do so he resisted (at
least he said he resisted) the temptation to seek the applause of
the moment. 4 Something worked. Twenty-four centuries later
people are still fascinated by that war, in which the most famous
democracy in history was at last utterly defeated, and Thucydides is their primary guide. So far, so good.
Anyone in the year 4400 who wants to learn about the creation of another democracy with great pretensions-this one proclaiming itself a new order for the ages-will want David Currie's book. Having read every constitutional case decided by the
Supreme Court in its first two centuries of operation and written
two wonderful books about them, Currie realized that he had
been dealing with an institutional latecomer. 5 Although the
Court is today generally regarded as the leading expositor of the
Constitution, for decades its role was secondary. As of 1840, for
example, far more constitutional questions had been debated
and resolved in Congress than in the Supreme Court. Moreover,
the issues resolved in Congress were probably more fundamental.
1. Edward H. Levi Distinghished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Thanks to Pam Karlan for
helpful discussion of some of the issues in this review.
3. Thucydides, The Peloponnessian War, in Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian 16 (Free Press, 1996).
4. Id.
5. See David P. Currie, The Constitution In the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years, 1789-1888 (U. of Chicago Press, 1985); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Coun: The Second Century, 1888-1986 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990).
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Knowing that the formative years are formative, Currie has
devoted a volume to the first six Congresses-those that sat
during what is commonly known as the Federalist period. That
period came to an end with the Revolution of 1800 and Currie's
account of the Sixth Congress concludes with a quotation from
Jefferson's first inaugural address. (p. 295)
Section I of this review describes briefly The Constitution In
Congress:· The Federalist Period. Section II then tries to make
use of Currie's work to consider one of the recurring issues in
the debate over the usefulness of judicial review: just how likely
is Congress to come right out and violate the Constitution?
I. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS
Readers of Currie's studies of the Constitution in the Supreme Court will find this book familiar. It is arranged chronologically and for each Congress identifies the most important
questions of constitutional construction that the legislature was
called on to address. Currie presents the different positions, the
arguments that were made for and against them, and Congress'
ultimate resolution of the issue. He adds his own substantive
comments, citations to the main primary sources from the time
that bear on the issue, and frequent prolepses to later times in
which the country (including the Court) has seen the question
again.
Such repeat readers will also find The Constitution In Congress: The Federalist Period familiarly instructive. Currie's laserlike legal analysis, complete mastery of constitutional practice
and case law, and grasp of the legal landscape at the time of the
framing make him the perfect author of this book. A great historian with a good knowledge of law would have written something different; Currie is great lawyer with a good knowledge of
history.
To give the reader a flavor of the book's coverage I will tick
off some examples of the issues that Currie discusses and then
recount in a little more detail his treatment of two now-obscure
debates that raised important constitutional questions. As was
inevitable, the First Congress addressed a series of fundamental
problems. Perhaps most thoroughly canvassed in the years since
is its action concerning the power of the President to remove
heads of department. After much to-ing and fro-ing, Congress
adopted legislation that recognized a presidential removal power
but did not purport to create one. (pp. 36-41) Courts and com-
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mentators have subsequently been through this issue in painful
detail, without adding much to the debate.
Presidential removal power was only one of the many points
of government structure that the Constitution did not address
specifically. Of similar importance was the federal courts' jurisdiction. Currie is hampered here by the fact that the Judiciary
Act originated in the Senate, which debated in closed session in
those days and kept no official record of itss debates, but he
finds illuminating things to say. (pp. 47-34) Then there was a
raft of other matters, some quite important, some minor. Many
had to do with Congress itself, including contested elections, (pp.
17-19) the apportionment of seats in the House, (pp. 128-135)
the House's appropriation power when the President made a
treaty that called for spending money, (pp. 211-217) congressional authority to investigate the executive branch, (pp. 163164) and whether Senators and Representatives were subject to
impeachment and removal, rather than just expulsion by one
house. (pp. 275-281)
A constitution's most important structural rules are those
that identify the persons entitled to exercise power, because
those are the rules that must be applied without the guidance of
people who hold power. Currie recounts the Sixth Congress'
treatment of the momentous question of disputed presidential
elections. Only once has there been a serious question as to the
electoral votes, but the possibility that it could happen was in
1800 and remains today a nightmare, as the events of 1876-1877
demonstrate it should be. Without a President the machine
comes to a halt. The Constitution's procedures for making laws
and treaties and for appointing to principal offices assume that
there is a President or someone authorized to exercise the pow6
ers and duties of the office. The Constitution authorizes Congress to deal with vacancies in the presidency created by removal, death, resignation, or inability to perform, Art. II, sec. 1,
para. 6, but not vacancies caused by a failure to elect. (p. 294
n.474) As for the provision under which the House of Representatives elects a President if none receives a majority of the electoral votes (Art. II, § 1, para. 3 in 1799, today the Twelfth
Amendment), it does not kick in until the House has been informed of the electors' action. A dispute about who the electors
are, or who they voted for, could entail a dispute as to whether
the choice had devolved upon the House.
6.

See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 7 (law making); Art. II,§ 2, para. 2 (appointment).
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In 1800, apparently anticipating a possible dispute over the
selection of presidential electors, Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania asked that a committee be appointed to consider the
7
problem. (p. 288) Despite objections that Congress had no
power to act on the issue, a committee was appointed and reported a bill under which a "Grand Committee" drawn from
both Houses of Congress would resolve disputes over the election of electors. (pp. 288-289) Although both Houses passed
versions of the bill, they were unable to reach an agreement and
nothing was presented to President Adams. (p. 289)
The debates, as Currie summarizes them, are constitutional
reasoning in a nutshell. Does Congress have any power to legislate in this area at all? One might think yes, because it is necessary and proper to the execution of the President's powers that
there be a President. As is so often the case with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, however, one easily can draw a contrary inference from the fact that Congress' powers with respect to
presidential elections are dealt with specifically and are quite
narrow: Congress can determine when electors are chosen and
when they vote but it cannot control the place or manner of their
selection as it can with respect to Representatives and Senators.8
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Moreover, as Currie points
out and as participants in the debates argued, one can readily
find in the Constitution a purpose of minimizing congressional
involvement in selecting the President. If anything is clear from
the text and the records of the Federal Convention, it is that as a
general matter Congress is not supposed to choose the President.
(pp. 290-291)
Currie sides with those who argued that it was up to the
States to provide mechanisms to resolve disputes as to their electoral votes. (p. 291) That is where the current statutes come
down too, 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15, and it is some relief-as long as the
States make such provision, and we know who their legitimate
governments are. 9

7. Currie recounts the story according to which Ross was afraid that the Pennsylvania legislature would deadlock and the State's Republican (that is, Jeffersonian) Governor would appoint a slate of electors. (p. 288 n.434)
8. Compare U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, para. 1 (power over time, place, and manner
of choosing Representatives and Senators), with Art. II, § 1., para. 4 (power to determine
time for choosing electors and day on which they vote, which must be the same throughout the country).
9. Sometimes, of course, it may be tricky to tell who is the government of a State.
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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After separation of powers the great category in American
constitutional law is federalism. I was mildly surprised to learn
that one of the central questions of federalism, Congress' power
to regulate and direct the States as such, came up fairly rarely.
Perhaps the early Congresses had quickly internalized the fundamental switch from the Articles of Confederation, under
which Congress acted on the States, to the Constitution, under
which it acts primarily on individuals directly. The issue did
arise from time to time, (e.g., pp. 228-229) and while Congress
did not seek systematically to direct the States or conscript them
to carry out federal law, it did impose administrative and ministerial duties on state officers. (e.g., pp. 65-66 n. 81, 87)
Congress does more than structure the government, of
course. It passes substantive laws. It is an axiom of the Constitution that whatever Congress does must be affirmatively
authorized; this is a system of enumerated power. Hence the
question repeatedly arose whether some proposed legislation
was within a constitutional grant, and Currie discusses various
appearances of that issue. Indeed, that is probably the issue he
discusses most often. (I have not actually counted.)
Likely the most famous enumerated-powers questions from
this period are two big-ticket items: the First Congress' legislation authorizing the Bank of the United States (pp. 18-80) and
the Sixth Congress' Alien and Sedition Acts. (pp. 253-262)
They are hardly alone, however, and I will discuss in a little more
detail a lesser known dispute that was another nutshell for constitutional argument.
Codfish got Congress tangled up in a constitutional net.
(pp. 168-169) New England's cod fisheries, said the Massachusetts legislature, needed help. They were victims of discriminatory tariffs and subsidies for their competitors. (Some things do
not change.) Secretary of State Jefferson proposed retaliatory
regulations and duties, but that approach would entail foreign
policy costs. What else might Congress do?
Today we would find the answer obvious: Congress could
give money to the codfishers, assuming it could come up with
some reason why aiding them would further the common de10
fense or general welfare. But that was not at all obvious then,
and was indeed the subject of heated debate. When Representative Barnwell of South Carolina anticipated contemporary doc10. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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trine by urging that Congress could tax and spend for any purpose that would advance the general welfare, (pp. 168-169) Representative Madison of Virginia jumped all over him, denying
the existence of any such power. (p. 169) Madison, however,
then proposed a sophistry that would enable the codfish lobby to
get what it wanted. While Congress could not simply give the
codfishers money, it could rebate to them the duties on imported
salt used to cure their catch. (p. 169) As Currie notes, (p. 169)
that somewhat undercut Madison's position. If the purposes for
which Congress may spend are limited, but neither the purposes
for which it may tax nor the purposes for which it may rebate a
tax are limited, a lot of spending for the general welfare is going
to be possible. Maybe Madison just wanted to ensure that the
codfish steamroller did not set an especially dangerous precedent by actually using the word "bounty." 11
Currie engages in a fair bit of editorializing, but identifies it
as such. At no point did it seem to me that he was spinning the
presentation in a way favorable to his own conclusion, and the
issues he deals with include several with which I am independently familiar. I identified only one substantive mistake in the
book, and it was about what happened in the 1990s, not the
1790s. As Currie explains, Congress in 1789 sent a package of
twelve proposed constitutional amendments to the States. (pp.
110-115) The third through twelfth proposals were quickly
adopted and became known as the Bill of Rights. The second of
those twelve had a more interesting history, eventually being
ratified by three-fourths of the States in 1992. Whether that long
drawn out process was in keeping with Article V is a subject of
much debate. Currie appears to believe that the so-called
Twenty-Seventh Amendment is an imposter. (p. 111 n.437) He
is especially annoyed that "Congress cravenly passed a resolution declaring it the law of the land." (Id.) Congress did not do
that. The Senate passed a resolution so declaring and the House
passed a similar resolution, but the two were not identical and
12
Congress,
neither body ever voted on the other's version.
which as David Currie knows better than most of us is a bicameral body, did nothing. Blame for cowardice, or praise for devo11. I was disappointed to find that despite their importance to constitutional history
our piscine friends of the cod persuasion do not have their own entry in the index. (p.
317)
12. CompareS. Con. Res. 120, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), with H. Con. Res. 320,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and the Article V process
are discussed in detail in Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lesson of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L. J. 677 (1993).
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tion to duty, should go to the Archivist of the United States, who
as Currie correctly notes (id.) proclaimed the amendment ratified.13
II. NO WRONG ANSWERS
Why might one think that judicial review of acts of Congress
is a good idea? The answer must be that the courts are likely to
correct congressional misinterpretations and violations of the
Constitution at an acceptable cost. That in turn requires the
conclusion that the courts are substantially more likely than
Congress to be right about the Constitution. That is not obviously true. Currie reports that the members of the First Congress, although of course often influenced by their views about
desirable policy, performed their function of constitutional interpretation "both capably and conscientiously." (p. 122) That
is about all one can hope for from a court, and more than one
sometimes gets.
One way to distract attention from this difficult comparison
is to convene the parade of horribles, describing the ways in
which Congress might blatantly violate the Constitution and silently assuming that of course a court would never do that. That
is the rhetoric of Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall had a very
nice question before him in that case. It is not clear whether
Congress may add to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. I tend to agree with Marshall but many do not. The
Chief Justice, however, did not discuss such situations in explaining that the Constitution provided for judicial review and
(as David Currie elsewhere points out) making the reader want
14
to agree with him. Instead, Marshall postulated a statute that
virtually had the words "This Is An Ex Post Facto Law" written
15
on top of it. He obscured the comparative question that so bedevils sophisticated normative advocates of judicial review by
discussing cases in which anyone but a liar or a fool would agree
as to what the Constitution requires.

13. The section on the Bill of Rights also contains a proofreading error. The text
indicates (p. 114) that there is a footnote 4457. Currie's documentation is ample, but not
that ample. It should be 457.
14. See Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court at 71 (cited in note 5).
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). According to Marshall,
a reading of the Constitution denying judicial review "would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual." Id. at 178.
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It is easy to see why Chief Justice Marshall used the examples he did. If Congress really were to pass an actual bill of attainder, a statute directing that a named individual should be
executed forthwith, most people would agree that it was unconstitutional and that something should be done about it. If one
also went along with the suppressed premise that the courts were
likely to do something about it, because they somehow were
immune from whatever had driven Congress to such extremes,
one might indeed think that judicial review was a good idea under those circumstances. And having come in for a penny one
might be in for a pound, agreeing that the courts should decide
dicey questions too, like Congress' authority to add to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if one thought that Congress was very,
very unlikely to adopt an actual bill of attainder one might well
think that taking precautions against that eventuality was not
worth much trouble. If the trouble included the costs of judicial
review, through which indirectly selected and largely unaccountable lawyers resolve ostensibly legal questions on the basis of
their substantive views, one might stop worrying what to do
about the pathological situation.
At this point The Constitution In Congress: The Federalist
Period enters with some evidence from real life. The Congresses
Currie discusses did not enact any clearly unconstitutional statutes or take any other clearly unconstitutional action. None of
their decisions, such as the provision reflecting presidential removal power, rested on a clearly incorrect reading of the Constitution. While one can agree or disagree with their resolution of
the many knotty problems they faced, one cannot point to an instance in which they reached a conclusion that no reasonable
person could agree was consistent with the Constitution. No
bills of attainder passed.
Before concluding that this evidence weakens the case for
judicial review insofar as that case is based on a concern that
Congress might pass blatantly unconstitutional laws I need to
deal with several natural objections. The first is that the Sixth
Congress, at least, did openly violate the Constitution when it
passed the Alien Act and the Sedition Act.
Much as we might like to believe otherwise, the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was at worst a close question. It was
not a plain departure from the principle of enumerated federal
power. Protecting the President and Congress from false and
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malicious criticism is much like protecting them from assassination, and is well calculated to enable them to do their jobs; it
thus carries their powers into execution. Nor does criminalizing
libel of federal officers and institutions make much of an inroad
into the legislative sphere normally occupied by the States, precisely because it is about criticism of federal officers and institutions. The States remained in charge of protecting their own officers and their own citizens from calumny. Nor was the Sedition
Act a plain violation of the First Amendment. It did not impose
a prior restraint, and it incorporated the principal American
modifications of the common law of seditious libel: the defense
of truth and jury determination of fact and law. (p. 261 n.198)
Its opponents may have been right on the constitutional question, but they were not obviously right.
The Alien Act seems to me a closer call. As Currie explains, its most troublesome component was Section 9, which
authorized the President to expel from the country any alien
whom he found dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States or whom he had reasonable grounds to suspect was engaged in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government. (p. 255) There was no provision for judicial proceedings.
Three serious constitutional objections can be leveled
against the Alien Act, none of which is a plain knock-down.
First, it had an enumerated powers problem. Congress has
power over foreign commerce and naturalization, but no explicit
power over non-citizens resident in the country. The 1798 Act,
however, was not about aliens in general. It was about aliens
who threatened national security. While there must be some
limits to Congress' power to protect the country's institutions, or
the principle of enumeration is meaningless, expelling specific
individuals who are reasonably believed to threaten the nation is
quite plausibly necessary and proper to a functioning government. Many years later, of course, the Supreme Court was to
take an even broader view of congressional power here, finding
that Congress has inherent authority to regulate the admission of
aliens and their privilege of remaining in the United States. 16
Second, the Act had delegation problems. It gave the
President wide latitude in deciding which aliens to deport. Nevertheless it was not clearly a transfer of the legislative power to
the executive. Under the Alien Act the President had to make
16. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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judgments as to threats to the peace and safety of the United
States. He was to apply the same criteria in making military
policy as commander in chief, a preeminently executive function.
Unless one wants to say that the Commander in Chief Clause is
actually an exception to the separation of legislative and executive power the way the Veto Clause is, one can readily characterize the decisions called for under the Alien Act as executive.
Finally, the Act provided for removal without judicial proceedings. Once again, that was not plainly unconstitutional. For
one thing, because the Act did not suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, any alien taken into custody by the executive would have
been able to obtain a judicial decision concerning the order of
detention. The extent to which the executive's decision would
have been treated as conclusive is not clear from the statute. In
any event, it was quite plausible to say, as at least one Federalist
did, that for aliens residence in the United States was a privilege
and not a right, so that full judicial process was not required before it could be taken away. 7 (p. 257)
Thus even the Alien Act was not an obvious violation of the
Constitution. It was, one can infer from Currie, the diciest statute Congress passed during the period he studied. Nothing else
was that close to the line.
Now for the second objection. Suppose that none of the
early Congresses did anything plainly unconstitutional. One
might think that fact irrelevant on the ground that they were not
seriously tempted to. There is some force to this point, and once
again I say only that the behavior of the first six Congresses gives
us some reason to believe that Congress is unlikely to act in a
way plainly contrary to the Constitution. Still, the 1790s presented some real temptations to take some blatantly unconstitutional step, all of which were resisted.
As should not surprise us, the events surrounding the Sedition Act provide a leading example. The Federalists in Congress
did not try to attaint anyone, even though they easily enough
could have made up an enemies list. If the Anti-Federalists had
really meant all that they said during the ratification debates
concerning the tyrannical tendencies of the new central government, they should have been astonished by their opponents'
moderation. The government was on the verge of war with
17. As Currie notes, (p. 257) the Supreme Court has from time to time employed
the rights-privilege distinction in finding that Congress has substantial power over the
procedures through which aliens are kept out of the country or removed from it.
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France and faced, many of its leaders believed, a disloyal opposition that was in the French pocket. That is the kind of situation
that brings out the worst in rulers, but the worst it brought out of
Congress was still arguably within the Constitution.
According to the third major objection, Congress was kept
in check by a widely shared expectation that there would be judicial review. That there was such an expectation Currie documents. (p. 120) But so what? Judicial review is just another
constitutional rule, like the ban on bills of attainder. Indeed, it is
famously less clear that the Constitution provides for judicial re18
view than that it bans, for example, unapportioned direct taxes.
A Congress that would attaint someone would have no scruple
about getting the judges out of the way if it could. And if the
President, the army, and ultimately the people were prepared to
go along with an attainder, which is blatantly unconstitutional, it
is hard to imagine why they would care if the courts reminded
them of that fact. If you can swallow attainder you can swallow
no judicial review. American political leaders who can defy the
Constitution can defy the courts, which take their authority from
19
the document and not the other way around.
Finally, there may be a problem with putting too much
stock in this particular piece of evidence. Currie covers a period
in which the Constitution of 1787 with its first ten amendments
reflected living political realities, consensus on some issues and
deals on others like the States' equal suffrage in the Senate.
Maybe Congress avoided doing anything openly unconstitutional
because of the underlying politics, not because of the independent principle that the Constitution is the law.
There is something to this point, but its importance should
not be overstated. While every provision in the Constitution
does not today represent a real consensus or a real settlement,
18. Article I, Section 9, paragraph 4 forbids unapportioned direct taxes, but there is
no judicial review clause.
19. It is worth remembering that this point about Congress, whatever its force, is
not an argument against the entire institution that we know as judicial review. It is not
an argument against the judicial role that the Supremacy Clause primarily identifies, that
of refusing to enforce unconstitutional state actions. State governments may well be
much more likely to pass plainly unconstitutional legislation than is Congress, and one
might think the courts better than the States at resolving nice questions. Nor is this an
argument against judicial enforcement of constitutional rules that apply directly to the
executive branch. What Congress does tells us little about what the Collector of the Port
of New York is likely to do, or about the extent to which the President is likely to keep
track of the Collector. But insofar as we are concerned about the straight·up Marbury
question, Currie's book gives us some reason not to worry that Congress will decide to
give each State three Senators.
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the principle that the Constitution is law very likely represents
the latter and quite possibly the former. So while we should not
abruptly generalize from the early days, we also should not simply throw the information away. Government always rests on
consensus and settlement.
III. FAME AND THE FOUNDERS' STUDENTS
Currie is a fan as well as a fair commentator, clearly regarding the people of the Federalist period as his fellow Americans. In this story that begins with the First Congress, his hero
appears to be the First President, "the indispensable focal point,
the glue that held the uncertain enterprise together." (p. 297)
Currie here emulates Representative John Marshall of Virginia,
who on the great man's death submitted to the House a resolution "dubbing him (really!) 'first in war, first in peace, and first in
the hearts of his countrymen."' (p. 275 n.313) Shortly thereafter
Congress adopted legislation that provided for appropriate
ceremonies, recommended commemorations to the citizenry,
and called for a monument to be erected. (Id.)
Currie has some fun at this point by keeping his eye on the
constitutional-law ball: "It seems churlish to question any of this,
but that is what this book is about. A resolution passed by the
same Congress to provide a medal to the Captain of the 'Constellation' suggests that recognition for services rendered may be
necessary and proper to the functioning of public offices (not
least, to attract qualified persons and encourage their best efforts). In any event, the monument was to be erected in the District of Columbia, over which Congress had the power of 'exclusive legislation."' (I d.)
The first proposed rationale, however it might work today,
was in that context a good means-end story under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. According to Douglas Adair, "the lust for
the psychic reward of fame, honor, glory, after 1776 becomes the
key ingredient in the behavior of Washington and his greatest
contemporaries." 20 Hamilton seems to have thought much of the
love of fame, which he called "the ruling passion of the noblest
minds." 21

20. Douglas Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers 8 (Norton, 1974).
21. Federalist 72 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 488 (Wesleyan
U. Press, 1961).
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David Currie's work, here and elsewhere, might lead us to
question Publius. If Currie is an indication, the ruling passion of
the noblest minds might be the pleasure of finding things out.22
Or maybe the two can go together. Thucydides wanted to get at
the truth so that he could make something that would be a possession for all time; he apparently hoped that his by-line would
survive with it. There are worse things to be famous for.

22.

I borrow that phrase from Richard Feynman.

